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model: a methodological appraisal
Valentin Cojanu
Bucharest University of Economics, Bucuresti, Romania
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to tackle in turn the merits and limits of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s
entropic model, as well as its implications for the methodological discourse in economics. This
appraisal of the Georgescu-Roegen’s work emphasizes the emergence of the entropic nature of the
economic processes as a paradigm à la Kuhn of explanation in social economics.
Design/methodology/approach – This work provides a critical assessment of the entropic model’s
main conceptual pillars, namely the role of mathematical formalism and the natural imagery of
irreversibility. This discussion takes them in turn and develops a critique from a methodological point
of view.
Findings – The focus of this work is that the proposed epistemological reconstruction of economics
is vulnerable to attacks from two methodological objections. The first deals with the change of
metaphor from the “pendulum” of mechanics to the “hourglass” of thermodynamics. The second refers
to the changes this replacement of metaphors brings about as to the relevance of the formalism of the
discipline.
Originality/value – This material has gathered arguments to show that the intellectual concurrence
of the arguments onto the field of physics makes the methodological value of the new paradigm of
entropy not transcend into a new logic of reasoning in economics. The limits of this approach stems
from the same rationale for which it has got its revolutionary stature: what it proposes consists of a
scientific discourse based on a mixture of evolutionary biology, economics and thermodynamics,
which may open up new original and insightful perspectives, but which has never been justified on
terms of economic nature alone.
Keywords Research methods, Economic processes, Economic models
Paper type Conceptual paper
Introduction
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1992) summarised, in a defeated mood, his life philosophy
with an enigmatic assertion: “After long years I have concluded that for the results of
one’s struggle the place from which one runs against a current matters enormously”.
By that time, he had been waging for more than three decades to persuade the
economics establishment that its methodological discourse ought to be based on a new
epistemology he calls “the entropic model”. His approach evolved from isolated
technical critiques of the neo-classical conceptual platform to a coherent, distinct,
radical exposition of economics on evolutionary premises. It is the purpose of this
paper to tackle in turn the merits and limits of the entropic model and discuss its
implications for the methodological discourse in economics.
A voluminous literature of reviews of Georgescu-Roegen’s contributions amassed
continuously both before and after his death in 1994, but the verdict is hardly
favourable as Mark Blaug notes: “[his] works have received virtually no critical
discussion from economists” (quoted in Daly, 1999). So, the reader would certainly
be tempted to follow Mirowski (2001) and wonder, “What all the fuss is about?”
The common criticism ascribes the unfortunate result to either “unfounded”
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interpretations of the relevance of the laws of thermodynamics to the economics of
production (Khalil, 2004) or to a neglect of the post-war advancements of neo-classical
economics in fields like “game theory, decision theory, and operations research”
(Mirowski, 2001).
This appraisal of the Georgescu-Roegen’s work emphasizes instead the emergence
of the entropic nature of the economic processes as a paradigm à la Kuhn of
explanation in social sciences and, particularly, in economics. The next section
continues with a presentation of its path-breaking epistemological developments and
attempts to discern the valid elements about knowledge in economics which ought to
be part of any future representation of the nature of economic reasoning. Against his
manifest discomfort with the severe limitations of the conventional approach in
economics, Georgescu-Roegen’s innumerable forays into the philosophy of science
substantiate his vision of a new analytical representation of economic processes based
on the entropy law.
At the same time, this thesis concurs with the view that his parallel effort to
mould this epistemology into a convincing method failed to live up to expectations.
A subsequent section provides a critical assessment of its main conceptual pillars,
namely the role of mathematical formalism and the natural imagery of irreversibility.
The final section concludes with considerations on the uncommon role the entropic
model plays in the present quest for a new method of economics.
The emergence of a paradigm
The Georgescu-Roegen’s intellectual destiny witnessed so intimately the tribulations of
the rise to distinction of the entropic model from isolated interrogations to the
full-fledged academic establishment of ecological economics that it can undoubtedly
make up a case in the study of scientific revolutions. Its mark spanned several
generations of economists in three distinct phases.
Firstly, he was widely acclaimed as an “accomplished mathematician” (Daly, 1999)
and, in Samuelson’s felicitous accolade, “an economist’s economist” – albeit an
accidental one: “I said to myself that . . . I have nothing to do with economics and
I do not wish to become an economist, never!” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1988).
His earliest contributions, he confesses, “ran with the current, which was then to
expand the legitimate use of mathematics in economics” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1992) and
thus secured him in the 1930s a highly auspicious reception at Harvard. There, eminent
scholars of the neoclassical school tried to elicit his attention: Samuelson (1996a)
remembers Georgescu-Roegen as an young deity during the 1939 Harvard Seminar;
Frank Taussig asks him to “serve as an honest broker on a controversy between A.C.
Pigou and Milton Friedman concerning Pigou’s recipe for measuring the elasticity of
demand” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1988); and Joseph A. Schumpeter proposes a joint
authorship of a treatise on theoretical economics, an offer Georgescu-Roegen
repentantly declines (Georgescu-Roegen, 1992).
Secondly, Georgescu-Roegen transformed himself into a non-conformist economist
whose inquiry into the epistemological foundations of the neoclassical economics
school was an unintended consequence of his efforts to correct the conventional
approach.
He begins his “conventional” period with the Pure Theory of Consumers’ Behaviour



























































recent papers on the subject and, finally, for developing an alternate theory of the
nature of indifference curves” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1936) and finishes it three
decades later with Analytical Economics, an impressive volume in which almost any
reading stands for a devastating attack on the neo-classical economics. His education
enables him to expose mathematical “missteps” of several notable mathematical
economists like Vilfredo Pareto, R. G. D. Allen, Milton Friedman, or dispel
“mathematical fantasies” in the works of many contemporaries (Georgescu-Roegen,
1988, 1992, 1993).
Thirdly, it is Georgescu-Roegen the mentor who sets the pattern of thought for the
newly established ecological economics school. His research into the biophysical
dimensions of economic activity inspired the creation of the International Society for
Ecological Economists and the founding of its journal Ecological Economics (Maneschi,
2000). Its exponents owe much to Georgescu-Roegen’s works on entropy and duly
acknowledge his pioneering contribution (Daly, 2004).
In its new role, Georgescu-Roegen resuscitates the economics discipline by trying to
instil its methodology with breakthrough physics achievements as represented by the
laws of thermodynamics. In the energy crisis-stricken climate of the 1970s, his
contributions in pure economics such as the demand theory and probabilistic
preferences or the production theory are sidelined in favour of a much more en vogue
model he had just developed: the irreversible transformation of matter and energy
along an economic process. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics gives
due credit to the economist who pioneered a bio-economic conception of economics
and to the entropy law that “is the most economic of the physics laws” (Zamagni,
1996a).
All together, the accidental, non-conformist and inspirational economist advanced
an epistemological reconstruction of economics based on the laws of thermodynamics.
Georgescu-Roegen finds with the entropy law, as defined by the second law of
thermodynamics, the solution for the controversial issues of economic inquiry which he
revealed in his early studies. It remains subject to further investigation how the two
main fields of knowledge – economics and thermodynamics – were connected in the
first place. Whatever the answer, the dual origin of the entropic model engenders a
heterodox approach to the analytical representation of economic processes, with
intermingling concepts and juxtaposed perspectives. At one time, one reviewer
commented that his discussion “wholeheartedly devoted” to economics does not
explicitly make use of the entropy law, while his digression in the philosophy of science
is not “explicitly about technical economics” either (Schlegel et al., 1973).
Three themes seem to dominate the epistemological discourse based on the entropic
model:
(1) the problem of time as a distinct factor in analytical representation of a
production process;
(2) dialectics as opposed to arithmomorphism as the logical foundation of
economics; and
(3) the limitations of the mathematical models.
This discussion takes each of them in turn and develops in a subsequent section a



























































In 1856, the German physicist Rudolph Clausius provided the mathematical proof that,
in a physical system which is isolated from the outside world and hence subject to the
principle of conservation of energy (the first law of thermodynamic systems), heat is
continuously and irrevocably converted from a source that involves a difference of
temperature from a warmer object to a colder one, and never in reverse. The physicist
coined the law entropy (the second law of thermodynamics), a word based on the Greek
term entrope, meaning a turning toward, to describe the probable behaviour of isolated
systems to produce mechanical work by turning energy, to which Georgescu-Roegen
adds as the fourth law of thermodynamics, and matter from available into unavailable.
Entropy has become a measure of the energy that is no longer available for work
during a thermodynamic process.
The irreversible flow of energy and matter which is implied by an entropic
transformation has made Georgescu-Roegen assert that “entropy is the sole temporal
law in physics” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1996, p. 141). In a succinct formulation, time
direction is a function of change of entropy from order-low entropy in the form of
useful energy-to increasing disorder-high entropy in the form of unavailable energy.
Duration as an interval between the past and the future becomes the epitome of any
representation in social sciences: change needs time to occur or to be perceived.
The ultimate goal of the economic process – the humankind’s well-being or
“enjoyment of life” in Georgescu-Roegen’s parlance – so becomes inescapably linked to
the passage of time: in their material existence, organisms survive on the condition that
they are capable of capturing low entropy from the environment (“the struggle for
entropy”). In opposition to the neo-classical vision of consumers’ utility maximization
under constraints of optimal allocation of scarce resources, Georgescu-Roegen envisions
a life implacably challenged by the irreversible degradation of energy and of matter
which “sets a more dreadful limit, a limit on the survival of the human species on this
planet” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1979). The social system should be so seen as a milieu
in which (economic) value originates in finite sources of low entropy and is
irrevocably destroyed in time rather than created through the mechanism of pricing.
The optimization problem turns its spatial dimension – a given endowment with
resources – into a temporal one: “enjoyment must be so arranged that the total pleasure
during one’s entire life should be a maximum deal” (quoted in Maneschi, 2000).
This change of perspectives engenders profound consequences as to the way
economists perceive the nature of economic processes. The notion of cause in physics is
not adequate for the study of economics and biology, in recognition of the evolutionary
processes inherent to the economic activity as Alfred Marshall first suggested in his
Principles. What distinguishes a biotic life – that is an eco-system with living creatures –
is the consumption of low entropy which is not purely a physical manifestation, but
irreversible transformations for the ultimate purpose of the “enjoyment of life”.
Because of entropy, historical facts give birth to controversies which are not easily
tractable within the deterministic framework. This epistemological interpretation
resonates well with the philosophy of science. Dragan and Demetrescu (1991, pp. 44, 86)
enlarge the issue by making reference to the works of Ludwig von Bertalanffy (General
Systems Theory, 1972) and Walter Buckley (Sociology and Modern Systems Theory,
1967) to represent causation in historical systems. The “direct cause – effect”



























































forms: final outcomes can be achieved by starting from different original conditions
and along different paths (the equi-finality principle) and similar initial conditions may
develop into dissimilar final states (the multi-finality principle).
Georgescu-Roegen (1996, p. 142) points to the erroneous treatment of time in
standard economics which makes behaviour dependent exclusively on present
conditions; any temporal location eludes history by assuming invariants of economic
phenomena. The continuum of time necessarily relates the social environment to
evolutions of qualitative change and thus to “the continuous emergence of novelty”
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1979), and not to discretely distinct – arithmomorphic in his
terminology – descriptions of economic processes. In contrast to the logical, rational
characteristic of the latter approach, which makes possible syllogistic reasoning and
calculations, the former facet of reality is not amenable to explanations from
“the already known phenomenal laws” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1979). To which ones
instead?
Discussion on dialectical reasoning
Half of the Georgescu-Roegen’s core message comes in clear-cut fashion: the
arithmomorphic fragmentation of the continuum of the social reality which characterizes
the methodological approach in modern economics is the main cause for our incapacity to
explain what happens within its limits; “a unitary seamless reality opposes division into
arithmomorphic pieces” (quoted in Dragan and Demetrescu, 1991, p. 180). The logic of this
scientific reasoning deals with distinct symbols, like m, 2 or 1, invariant concepts that
make the investigation powerless in dealing with propositions like “Culturally determined
wants are higher than biological needs” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1992). Propositions about the
observed phenomena follow a logical order, for instance, of the type that “the measures of a
triangle’s angles add to the measures of two rectangular angles”; one proposition follows
logically from another one.
On the other hand, there is a confessed understanding of the limits of the model.
Georgescu-Roegen is aware that the innovative approach the entropic model suggests
as to the treatment of time may inspire a new method of scientific inquiry he calls
“dialectical reasoning”, but also repeatedly says Georgescu-Roegen (1992; 1996, p. 51)
that “a new Aristotle might set dialect[ic]al reasoning on as a solid basis as the
traditional logic”. What the Roegenian epistemology provides instead consists of a
conceptualization whereby Georgescu-Roegen differentiates between analysis and
dialectics, and so the analyst has reasoning opposed to memory, the invariant opposed
to history, with the observation that the “dialectical concepts” are deprived of the
character of law as suggested by Hegel or Marx (Georgescu-Roegen, 1992).
A special feature of social events makes any scientific inquiry based on
arithmomorphism hardly tractable: the existence of “dialectical penumbras” that
surround the attempt to investigate the temporal events, a process in which the
penumbra creates an infinite dialectical regression that opposes the “vacuous
boundary” of an arithmomorphic concept.
Georgescu-Roegen identifies the critical issue in the third principle of logic, that is one
may not have both A and non-A true. Nevertheless, on observing tertium non datur,
dialectical reasoning unites opposite concepts by a penumbra – “it is within this
penumbra that both A and non-A are true” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1979) – and can thus


























































like elements of dictatorship in a democracy, or varying facts, like interpersonally
comparable wants. If one changes an arithmomorphic feature of a square, say one of its
angles, the square ceases to be a square, but one can indeed represent a modified dialectical
concept, say democracy under various circumstances of minimum voting age, and
the concept will still preserve its validity. As it happens, a social scientist’s list of
fundamental concepts like “justice, democracy, good, evil, abstraction, workable
competition, entrepreneur, farmer, occupation, belief” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1979) falls
under the dialectical order of the theory.
The entropy law seems to stand for the perfect representation of this logic. It reflects
“basic limitations of all living creatures” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1992) by their continuous
struggle to get control of low entropy sources in an environment where both matter
and energy are subject to irreversible degradation. The scientist’s representations of
social facts change their intrinsic value with the passage of time as an inexorable
consequence of increasing entropy. In contrast to standard economics that rests on a
circular flow embodied in the principle of energy conservation, the economic activity
results in irreversible changes in the environment.
The great corollary of the entire conceptual system is expressed by the definition of
value. Economic scarcity continues to be the main constraint to the achievement
of what Georgescu-Roegen calls the output of any economic activity, “the enjoyment of
life”, only that the economic value now lies in “the entropic degradation of energy
and of matter in bulk” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1992). Against the hedonic principle of
conventional economics, of continuous growth and variations of “self-identical
elements” such as investments or utility, the entropic model opposes conservation of
resources and neglect of modern consumerism.
Discussion on mathematical models
Georgescu-Roegen’s early forays into the analytical power of mathematical models
made him reach a verdict which hardly needs any commentary: “economic phenomena
are not governed by a mathematical network” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1992). Nevertheless,
his choice as to the use of mathematics is somewhat equivocal. On the way, much of the
early radicalism turned into a new form of calculus, this time faithful to a different
paradigm in physics, i.e. entropy. It is so more pertinently to assume that his attitude
should be seen as a position against the mechanistic representation of economic
processes with its reversible nature that infringes on the entropic principles rather than
a genuine abhorrence to the abuse of mathematics, opposition which at any rate
justifies alone the unsympathetic reception from his neo-classical fellows.
Georgescu-Roegen takes any occasion to reaffirm his faith in Blaise Pascal’s
“immortal” dichotomy between esprit géométrique and esprit de finesse. The French
scholar warned that “mathematicians are lost in the field of finesse where the
principles are so subtle and so numerous that one must have a very delicate and very
clear sense to perceive and judge them correctly and justly” (quoted in Dragan and
Demetrescu, 1991, p. 79). His trying at reconciling the two produces a model of
scientific inquiry “which must necessarily aspire to be quantitative and hence
mathematical” while giving due credit to “the absolute necessity of historical and
institutional studies in social studies, hence in economics” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1979).
The pieces of evidence were gathered in successive phases, from



























































representation of facts” that is presented in his Entropy Law and the Economic
Process (1971).
He opposes the Cowles Commission, which in the 1930s was seeking for a
mathematical procedure to predict the evolutions on the stock market, on the ground
that historical, unique processes cannot be described by a mathematical, “necessarily
ahistorical formula” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1988). Georgescu-Roegen’ remark about “the
ineptitude of predicting economic futures by econometric models” was considered one
of the “irritating blunders” by the adherents of the neo-classical school
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1992).
The contact with the inter-war realities of Romania, a developing, agrarian country,
provokes a harsh critique of the cornerstone of the standard analysis – the marginal
criterion – which simply does not hold in such circumstances: the marginal price
does not maximize the national product in economies characterized by scarcity.
He instead makes a substantial plea to give the institutional norms a key role in
understanding that type of economies: “In conditions of scarcity, income distribution is
made not according to marginal pricing, but according to some institutional rules”
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1992).
Georgescu-Roegen’s answer gets more elaborated with the fundamental distinction
he makes in Economic Theory and Agrarian Economics (1960) between the exact
pattern of natural sciences and the analytical scheme of social sciences
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1996, p. 321). This methodological delimitation paves the way
for the construction of the logic of reasoning based on the analytical representation of
facts: understanding in any field of study is based on two sorts of concepts,
arithmomorphic and dialectical (Georgescu-Roegen, 1996, p. 104).
The method of inquiry is determined by the class/order of the phenomena under
investigation. According to Georgescu-Roegen (1996, pp. 120-1), the scientist confronts
three types of facts: rational of the first order, whose representation is essentially based
on algebraic deductions; rational of the second order, whose representation depends
primarily on empirical observations; and, finally, rational of the third order, whose
representation is highly unpredictable, as the correlations between their constitutive
elements are decisively afflicted by irregularities. It is this last category of facts which
appear particularly important for the study of economic phenomena. The two opposing
views on random (the deterministic and the in-deterministic) are “the two ends of one
and the same bridge between human understanding and the actual world”
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1996, p. 67).
Is there a way to handle this indeterminacy within the limits of scientific
investigation? Georgescu-Roegen thinks that the answer consists of a radical
transformation of mathematical models in the sense that the stochastic form is the sole
possibility by which the natural laws can be represented, instead of being a peripheral
form. This conception lies at the core of the new proposed representation of
phenomena. On the one hand, it enables a better analytical refinement based on
randomness, where chances of any fact to occur are arbitrary, and haphazardness,
which describes facts that may repeat themselves. On the other hand, it introduces
probability associated with natural phenomena as a dialectical concept defined by
randomness, “for randomness implies irregularity, unlike the desultory haphazardness


























































The entropic model: a critique of its methodological value for economics
The conceptual construction of the entropic model is immense. In the eyes of one
sympathetic reviewer, besides being a “fundamental work . . . it is also incomplete, at
times inconsistent and both over- and underemphasises different topics” (Schlegel et al.,
1973). The focus of this section is that the proposed epistemological reconstruction of
economics is vulnerable to attacks from two methodological objections. The first deals
with the change of metaphor from the “pendulum” of mechanics to the “hourglass” of
thermodynamics. Despite contrary claims, the latter leaves unscratched the edifice
of the traditional logic too. The second refers to the changes this replacement of
metaphors brings about as to the relevance of the formalism of the discipline. The
answer is a disconcerting “none”, the more so one of the main Georgescu-Roegen’s
disappointments with the conventional thinking concerns its emphasis on “analysis”
and neglect of “dialectics”.
The metaphor of pendulum vs the metaphor of hourglass
Georgescu-Roegen struggled along his entire lifework to persuade his fellow
economists that economics should receive a different treatment as to its methodological
approach; the mechanistic view of the classics is both flawed and unsuitable to the
study of economic facts, he argued. In spite of the merits of the ensuing epistemological
construction, there are indications that his approach has never left the field of physics.
Georgescu-Roegen followed Karl Marx and did not consider the economic process as
an isolated or closed system, but, relying on support from evolutionary biology, an
extension of the biological evolution. The economic life is seen as an irreversible
degradation of entropy, free energy is transformed into bound energy, and not as a
pendulum swinging toward an equilibrium position, the mindset which set the
foundation of neo-classical economics. The neoclassical representation is reducible
to replaceable inputs, recyclable matter and energy conservation; however large the
swings, the pendulum will always set in motion a circular flow. The adoption of
the second law of thermodynamics however required a paradigmatic change.
The metaphor of hourglass was instead adopted to suggest the irreversible and
irrevocable path of energy and matter towards extinction.
So, the economist is asked to substitute one obsolete metaphor for a new one devised
along with the advancement of physics. Neither his work, nor his commentators’
opinions place the entropic model outside physics. Henri Guitton (1996, p. 134),
introducing the entropic model, has no doubt that the philosophical rationale of
economics should rely on physics foundations and praises Georgescu-Roegen for the
effort to bridge the gap between theoretical physics and economics. Onicescu (1996,
p. 177), one of his mathematics professors in the formative years, also admires his
contribution to explaining both physical and economic phenomena; the entropy law is
regarded as a unifying principle for natural and social sciences. Mirowski (1996) places
Georgescu-Roegen’s contribution on the worthy path of finding an answer to an urgent
analytical problem of economics – Why so many economists and engineers stay firm
in their incomprehension of the physical character of the economic process?
As his work reflects it, the economic phenomena depend on the physical and
chemical laws of people’s internal and external environment. It is this natural process
so heavily embedded in living creatures’ organization of (economic) activities



























































His view on social conflict, for example, is an illustration of why the epistemological
constraints do not reposition the scientific understanding by means of an economic
method proper. He remains much attracted by the insightful approach of Plato to the
theory of elites, but departs from the antique wisdom by saying that the reason for
which social conflict will extend into the indefinite future is not mankind’s division into
classes, but the looming struggle over low-entropy resources. In fact, it seems that the
only compassionate consideration about human species’ behaviour Georgescu-Roegen
makes consists in its determination “to have a short but extravagant existence”
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1992). He borrows metaphors from physics and biology, but is not
yet resolved to discard the neoclassical postulate altogether, as it refers to a natural
imagery applied to social interaction, along with its embedded formalism.
The recourse to formalism
Georgescu-Roegen’s famous remark which concludes his study on The Nature of
Expectation and Uncertainty (1958), “there is a limit to what we can do with numbers,
as there is to what we can do without them”, is in fact preceded by an abstract study in
probabilistic theory in which no reference is made to whatsoever social or historical
context. It is just an early example of his indecisive departure from formalism.
After the publication of his opus on Entropy Law (1971), one commentator also noticed
that his quantitative and theoretical writing is accompanied by “virtually no empirical
data” (Schlegel et al., 1973).
Revolutionary and non-conformist though he came to be known within the
economists’ community, Georgescu-Roegen is at ease among his neo-classical fellows.
His autobiographical notes speak of the consumer choice being related to a topological
axiom which means that “the indifference planar elements form a convex structure
relative to the origin of coordinates” and the solution he proposes leads to “a stochastic
distribution of some particular varieties at every point of the commodity space”
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1988). He finds the book of the agrarian economist Virgil
Madgearu (Agrarianism, Capitalism, Imperialism, 1936) a profound study that
deserves (at the time of writing in 1993) to be translated in English for a broader
recognition, although that Romanian economist cannot “establish any dialogue about
points of pure economic theory” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1993). He admits that the
literature of purely mathematical exercises “correspond to absolutely no facts, not even
to physical ones” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1992), but provides an extended investigation
following the line of Bauer-Sweezy thesis on the Mathematical Proofs of the Breakdown
of Capitalism (1960).
Georgescu-Roegen’s choice of using mathematics does not result evidently from his
epistemology. Several instances would have suggested a novel interpretation of the
economic method as well: his emphasis on dialectical penumbras to reveal
interpenetrations of historical events; his manifest sympathy for such anti-neoclassical
schools of thought as Marxism, German historical school or American institutionalism; or
his harsh critique of the futile arithmomorphism. According to Georgescu-Roegen, the
economist should continue to be well versed in mathematics for two well-reasoned
justifications. First, the traditional benefits of any quantitative analysis should be
preserved whether for the economy of thinking it produces (Georgescu-Roegen, 1996,
p. 322), to point to flaws in verbal economists’ reasoning (Georgescu-Roegen, 1996, p. 327)


























































solution is required (Georgescu-Roegen, 1979). Second, the Roegean epistemology rests on
a technical apparatus based on the probability theory powerful enough to reveal the
indeterminism associated with the dialectical concepts. So, the whole spectrum of
economics domain falls again under the prevalence of mathematical tool-kits.
A title of one of his chapters reads “mechanics vs thermodynamics”
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1995), a preference highly suggestive of the methodological
battlefield which paved the way towards the adoption of the entropy law. It is this
game of continuous search for low entropy that determines the fate of humanity. One
may perceive the human action only in relation to its struggle to overcome the entropic
barrier: the search for new territories, like for example the discovery of the New World
in 1492 or the astronomic journey to the Moon, are planned under increased pressure
stemming from the scarcity of natural resources (Georgescu-Roegen, 1995, pp. 51-2).
A perfect natural process thus frames the constraints of economic activity, this time
not in a system that is closed and circular, but open to sources of energy – mineral
deposits, solar radiation, etc. – and degradable. The dialectical penumbra, as the typical
analytical representation of any process, becomes defined on the coordinates of flows,
stocks, and funds (the material basis of the process). The new formalism mirrors a
change of paradigm, not a new method of inquiry: both the formulation and the
formalism of the entropic model are based on the same logic of analytical representation
of the natural processes.
Concluding remarks
With his entropic model, Georgescu-Roegen meets the exigencies of the most convivial
criticism of the neo-classical economics: the new economics should try to learn from
physics not to replicate it (Mirowski, 1996, p. 218). Georgescu-Roegen’s remarkable
incursion in the philosophy of science proves that physics may remain the beloved of
the methodologist, but any attempt to go beyond the present dissatisfaction with the
economic method is deemed to remain fruitless in the absence of a broader intellectual
contribution from within the realm of economics.
This material has gathered arguments to show that the entropic model embodies an
analytical inquiry of the economic processes based on a vast philosophical quest for
epistemological reinterpretation in fields of study as diverse as statistics, biology,
history, and, of course, physics. This vast methodological journey has produced
profound results. The new perspective on time, arithmomorphism and dialectical
reasoning helps the observer get a better understanding of the economic events. There
however remains a problematic aspect of all this emblematic effort, for it sets out as a
devastating account on the epistemological importance of one field (mechanics) of
physics just to advance the logic of another field (thermodynamics) of physics. And all
this to the noble task of reforming economics! At least two arguments seem to suggest
that the task of creating a new method remains unfulfilled.
First, Georgescu-Roegen addressed the economists’ audience, even if it had been more
appropriate to look for the physicists’ attention. The practical implications of the entropic
model as illustrated by its “minimal bio-economic programme” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1995,
pp. 102-11) represent considerate suggestions on the issues of matter and energy in the
global terrestrial environment subject to the scarcity of resources. His plan of action on
such points as unhindered migration or control of population growth results as a



























































allegation that Georgescu-Roegen’s firm belief that science in not able to stop the
irreversible use of the utilisable energy has received strong opposition from scientists like
Ilya Prigogine, supported by economists like Robert Solow who argued that “the world
can, in effect, get along without natural resources” (quoted in Georgescu-Roegen, 1992).
The physics realm does not extend a more favourable welcome to his conceptual
developments either, whose reception varies from outright ignorance (Jenkins, 2005) to
open criticism (Khalil, 2004).
As for his fellow economists, Georgescu-Roegen confessed that he never crossed
“intellectual swords” with them (Georgescu-Roegen, 1992). Such an authoritative text
as The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics (Pearce, 1992) finds no entry for “entropy
law” or “Georgescu-Roegen”. When asked to enlist what he would consider as G-R’s
most important scientific contributions, Mirowski (1996) remarks that most of them
were either appropriated or left in oblivion by other economists. It is by no means an
astonishing result of all his great achievements in the field of economic science.
Second, the entropic model does not effectively reach to the task which it initially
assumes, namely to provide a refined analytical form for understanding the evolutions
surrounding the enjoyment of life. Several shortcomings of the model are responsible
for this outcome like its obsession with physical transformations or its simplistic
answers to fundamental economic problems. It is probably this latter result which
stands out as one of the main causes of its methodological failure. It could be
mentioned here that the cultural patterns are unconvincingly described by a
dichotomised representation of economic systems between advanced and agrarian
economies; or that the humankind is so far knowledgeable of only three sets of viable
technological advancements, namely husbandry, the mastery of fire, and the steam
engine (Georgescu-Roegen, 1992), all “Promethean” recipes that prove capable of
self-sustaining contributions (inputs) to economic progress.
Georgescu-Roegen’s commanding intellectual stature creates resources that feed the
entropic model from innumerable sources of knowledge. It is for this reason that its
revolutionary concepts and insightful perspectives have made a lasting contribution to
the methodological reconstruction of economics. The limits of this approach stems
from the same rationale for which it has got its revolutionary stature: what it proposes
consists of a scientific discourse based on a mixture of evolutionary biology, economics
and thermodynamics, which may open up new original and insightful perspectives, but
which has never been justified on terms of economic nature alone.
In the entropic model, economic activity remains as impersonal as the mechanistic
outlook describes it; it is about converting scarce matter and energy of low entropy and
of economic value (solar energy and natural resources) into high entropy (pollution,
waste, dissipated heat) to produce output in the form of life enjoyment. The intellectual
concurrence of the arguments onto the field of physics makes the methodological value
of the new paradigm of entropy not transcend into a new logic of reasoning in
economics. In both contents and formalism it stays inseparable from the present
methodological discourse. In a modified perspective of scientific inquiry, it is as if the
chemical analysis of water were conditional on people’s perception of taste and not
exclusively on its molecular composition. In reverse, the same holds true for economics:
one cannot think of social events in sui generis investigative representations of flows of



























































The entropic model replaces the natural imagery of circular motion of the pendulum
with the one of irrevocable conversion of the hourglass, and correspondingly adopts a
modified formalism, that is, the very reason against which this new methodological
inquiry was devised in the first place. To be sure, it is not his continued use of
formalism that makes the methodological proposition vulnerable; it is because it does
not play the role Georgescu-Roegen thinks it should play in solving problems which
are dialectical in nature. On the contrary, the formalism in the sense of using
mathematics signals no significant departure from the neoclassical edifice.
References
Daly, H.E. (1999), “How long can neoclassical economists ignore the contributions of
Georgescu-Roegen?”, in Mayumi, K. and Gowdi, J. (Eds), Bioeconomics and
Sustainability: Essays in Honour of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, pp. 13-24.
Daly, H.E. (2004), “Ecological economics: the concept of scale and its relation to allocation,
distribution, and uneconomic growth”, in Fullbrook, E. (Ed.), A Guide to What’s Wrong
with Economics, Anthem Press, London, pp. 247-61.
Dragan, J.C. and Demetrescu, M.C. (1991 [1986]), “Entropy and bioeconomics”, The New
Paradigm of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Nagard, Roma.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1936), “The pure theory of consumer’s behaviour”, The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, Vol. 50 No. 4, pp. 545-93.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1979), “Methods in economic science”, The Journal of Economic Issues
XIII, Vol. 2, pp. 317-28.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1988), “An emigrant from a developing country: autobiographical notes – I”,
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Vol. 164, pp. 3-31.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1992), “Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen about Himself”, in Szenberg, M. (Ed.),
Eminent Economists, Their Life Philosophies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
pp. 128-59.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1993), “An emigrant from a developing country: autobiographical notes – II”,
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Vol. 184, pp. 4-30.
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